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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
TERRY WAYNE PERDUE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 900081-CA 
Category No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of murder in the 
second degree, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989) after a jury trial in the Third 
Judicial District Court. This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
this appeal which has been poured over from the Utah Supreme 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (Supp. 1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON 
APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether defendant cannot claim instructional error 
for the first time on appeal where he failed below to state a 
specific objection to the trial court's use of his own requested 
jury instructions? Objections to jury instructions must be 
specific and in the record, absent manifest injustice. Utah R. 
Crim. P. 19(c). However, appellate courts will not review a 
claim of manifest injustice when counsel "affirmatively led the 
trial court to believe that nothing was wrong with the 
instruction." State v. Medina 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987). 
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant of murder in the second degree instead of manslaughter? 
An appellate court views the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the jury's verdict, and will overturn the conviction only if 
the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained 
a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime of which he 
was convicted. State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah R. Crim. P. 19(c). 
No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter to 
which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a parties failure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with murder in the second degree, 
a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1989) (R. 6-7). Defendant was convicted as charged 
following a jury trial on October 2-4, 1989 in the Third Judicial 
District Court, the Honorable Frank G. Noel, Judge, presiding 
(R. 25). Judge Noel sentenced defendant to serve a term of five 
years to life in the Utah State Prison (R. 145-46; 179, p. 8). 
Additionally, Judge Noel enhanced defendant's sentence for use of 
a firearm in the commission of the crime by imposing a sentence 
of zero to five years to run consecutively with defendant's 
sentence for second degree murder (R. 146; 179, p. 8). 
-2-
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the late afternoon of October 18, 1988, defendant 
received a telephone call from the victim, Jerry Kadell Hermansen 
(T. 88-89, 104, 174, 185). Hermansen asked defendant to pick 
him up at a bar in Sandy and give him a ride (T. 88, 105, 112). 
Hermansen had traded rides for cocaine in the past (T. 182). 
When defendant arrived, Hermansen indicated he had to 
retrieve a pillowcase from a nearby building (T. 89, 185). After 
Hermansen retrieved the pillowcase, he showed defendant the 
contents—a revolver, a buck knife, and some ammunition (T. 89, 
113, 185). Hermansen suggested that they use the gun for target 
practice (T. 90, 115, 186-87). He also suggested they share some 
cocaine in his possession (T. 105, 186). In order to fire the 
revolver, they decided to travel to the area near the Salt Lake 
City dump (T. 89, 186-87). 
Enroute, defendant and Hermansen started to argue about 
a supposed drug debt defendant owed to Hermansen (T. 90, 117, 
187) When they arrived at the dump, defendant and Hermansen 
snorted Hermansen's cocaine—defendant snorting two lines of 
cocaine, Hermansen snorting six (T. 189, 190). Hermansen wanted 
defendant to obtain more cocaine (T. 190). Defendant refused. 
Id. After they had fired some shots, they started arguing again, 
with Hermansen demanding that defendant pay his debt. Id. 
Hermansen took the keys out of the ignition and told defendant he 
The facts leading to Hermansen's death come primarily from 
defendant's post-Miranda statement to Salt Lake Police Detective 
Donald Bell and defendant's own testimony at trial (T. 85-130, 
176-223). The State takes no position on the veracity of these 
statements. 
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would keep the car in lieu of the debt or until the debt was 
repaid (T. 90-91, 118, 191, 192-93). 
Hermansen had the gun and was reloading it during the 
argument (T. 117, 118, 193, 194). Defendant watched Hermansen 
load three bullets into the gun (T. 91, 194) Defendant demanded 
that Hermansen return the keys (T. 195-96). Hermansen refused 
(T. 196). Considering himself in danger, defendant hit Hermansen 
with his fist and took the revolver (T. 91, 119, 196, 197-98). 
At this point, defendant's version of events starts to 
differ between his statement to police and his testimony at 
trial. According to his police statement, Hermansen took the 
knife out and lunged at defendant (T. 87, 91-92). The knife 
struck the car (T. 92). Defendant held Hermansen's hand 
containing the knife in one hand as they struggled (T. 92, p. 
120). They fell to the ground and the gun discharged. Id. 
Hermansen again lunged at defendant, defendant closed his eyes 
and fired again twice (T. 93, 120-21). Then, according to the 
police statement, defendant threw the gun into the Jordan River 
(T. 93). 
In reality, defendant gave the gun to his cocaine 
supplier in return for $20.00 worth of cocaine (T. 54-57). He 
brought the gun to her wrapped in a towel (T. 55). The knife, 
according to Salt Lake Police Officer John Johnson, was found 
folded in Hermansen's pocket (T. 33). The gun was ultimately 
retrieved and ballistics tests verified that the gun recovered 
fired the shots which killed Hermansen (T. 73, 76). 
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At trial, defendant gave a different version of events. 
After hitting Hermansen, defendant fell on top of Hermansen, 
pinning Hermansen's legs with his hip (T. 198). The gun was in 
Hermansen's left hand with defendant's hand over Hermansen's. 
Id. Somehow in the struggle, the gun fired hitting Hermansen's 
hip. Id. Nonetheless, Hermansen jumped up and advanced toward 
defendant who closed his eyes and fired two shots, one hitting 
Hermansen in the neck (T. 198-99). The fight ended in a matter 
of seconds (T. 200). 
Defendant threw the gun on the seat of the car, 
retrieved the keys from Hermansen, and dragged him to the side of 
the road (T. 200, 208-09, 217). In a panic, defendant drove away 
(T. 200). Two cartridges remained in Hermansen's right hand (T. 
208). Defendant admitted lying to police officers about the 
shooting (T. 201). Defendant claimed he did not want to 
implicate his cocaine dealer (T. 202, 211). 
Defendant also testified that he did not think he could 
claim self-defense in Utah (T. 201). However, when being 
questioned by Detective Bell, defendant discussed self-defense 
with the detective (T.96, 107). After this discussion, defendant 
admitted to Detective Bell that an earlier statement to the 
police had been incorrect (T. 108). Defendant told Detective 
Bell that he felt he had to fight since Hermansen had the gun and 
only five bullets were left (T. 119). However, defendant only 
mentioned the knife after the police asked him about it (T. 124). 
Defendant also admitted initiating the fight (T. 126). 
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Defendant admitted at trial that he had lied to 
Detective Bell and other police officers (T. 201, 202-03). He 
claimed that he decided to admit his responsibility after talking 
with his wife (T. 203). On cross-examination, defendant admitted 
that there had been no prior incidents of violence between 
himself and Hermansen and he characterized Hermansen as a friend 
(T. 205-06). He admitted Hermansen had never pointed the gun at 
him and that the cylinder of the gun was open. (T. 214-15). 
Hermansen never told defendant he was going to shoot him, nor did 
Hermansen threaten defendant with violence, although they were 
both getting ready to fight (T. 215, 218). Hermansen threw no 
punches (T. 218). After shooting Hermansen, defendant neither 
checked his victim to see if he was alive, nor did he tell 
anybody what had happened (T. 217, 218). 
At trial, Assistant State Medical Examiner, Sharon 
Schnittker, testified about Hermansen's wounds and cause of death 
(T. 130-68). Dr. Schnittker testified that she performed the 
Hermansen autopsy (T. 132). As part of her autopsy, she went to 
the scene of the killing. Id,. Hermansen's sweatshirt had entry 
and exit wounds consistent with a shot to the chest (T. 134). 
Hermansen's jeans had a hole consistent with a back to front 
gunshot (T. 134-35). Abrasions to Hermansen's skull could have 
been caused by either a fall or a blunt object (T. 136). His 
body had other abrasions as well (T. 136-37). No tattooing or 
stippling was found on Hermansen's body or clothes (T. 140). 
Tattooing and stippling consists of particles of gunpowder 
burning into the skin or clothing. Id. Because there was no 
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tattooing ox stippling, all the shots would have to be fjLred t ,1 om 
more than fourteen inches away. Id. 
He m a n sen Iia 1! received three gunshot wounds, which Or, 
Schnittker arbitrarily labeled as #]
 (l #21( and #3 ( I 1 3 7) WniiniJ 
#] was fired! into the right side of the neck, slightly downward/ 
and ex I ted t:l ICE • ] Il * -" " '" • t I I H ' i ro u g h t h e s p i n a l 
chord, ][d. The bullet -raveled almost parallel to the 
perpendicular plane of Hermansen's body at about a 30 degree 
a n g l e Crotti I l ie f I "Ul j T l i i » w r u i f i d w o n I • - •-. 
total paralysis from the neck down, collapse, unconsciousness, 
and death -
1 t I mi J 1 1 ji li I ( j I <-; j i )i > i 1 1 t ! h ^ J i l i t 1 ^ I 
(T. 14 0-4 . .ie: exited the left front side of the chest 
and entered Hermansen o elbow. Id. If Hermansen was standing 
upright when shot, the bu.1 let t r a v e l e d p a r a l l e l tn I In-' t luoi | T" . 
141). Wound #3 entered the back of the left hip. I^d. Dr. 
Schi :i :ii ttker described it as a straight shot from the rear (T. 141-
42) . 
Defense counsel stipulated t :> the pathologist' s 
deteiriTti ii'ia I; IUIII oil I llif iHiit , H K J t p o i n t s of H e r m a n s e n ' s w o u n d s 
(T. 143) Wound 4 - a 1111 w\ inJ i ,i\. i } exited in 1:1 le f it: on t (T 
144). No determination was made whether Hermansen was standing 
o However, Hermansen 
could not have fired the shot whic wounded his hip ('[', 148). 
Hermansen's body was discovered the morning after the shooting 
( 
Prior to trial, both the prosecutor and defense counsel 
submitted proposed jury instructions to the trial court (R. 46-
57, 59-94). Among defendant's proposed jury instructions were 
instructions on reasonable doubt and self-defense (R. 59, 94). 
(See Appendices MAM and HC") Defendant's proposed reasonable 
doubt and self-defense instructions were identical to the 
instructions given by the trial court at the close of the trial 
(R. 114, 129). (See Appendices "B" and "D") Nonetheless, 
defense counsel objected to the use of his reasonable doubt 
instruction at trial (T. 281). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant requested both of the jury instructions he 
now challenges on appeal. This Court should decline to consider 
defendant's claim of instructional error because he invited the 
claimed error. Allowing defendant to challenge his own jury 
instructions on appeal is procedurally unjustified and viewed by 
appellate courts both in Utah and elsewhere with disfavor. 
Additionally, the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require 
defendant to specifically state his grounds for objecting to the 
jury instructions at trial. Defendant did not do so, relying 
instead on a vague, conclusive statement with no basis in law. 
The basis for the objection must be distinctly stated absent 
manifest injustice. However, since defendant initially proposed 
the allegedly erroneous jury instructions, no manifest injustice 
can occur. 
The jury had sufficient evidence to convict defendant 
of murder in the second degree. No dispute exists that defendant 
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killed the victim, the only question is whether defendant had the 
requisite culpable mental state for second degree murder. The 
State presented evidence that tie t en da i it shut the viet im Twice in 
the back and once in the side A reasonable jury could accept 
the evidence as either proof of defendant's intent to kill the 
victim or, alternatively, i intending to cause serious bodily harm 
leading to the victim's death The jury was under no obligation 
to believe defendant's version of events presented HL trial, 
particularly since defendant had admittedly 2 ied to the po] i ce, 
Since there was reasonable evidence to support defendant, s 
ronv i rt i on , t h 1 s P< HIT f shnu 111 „i fin in defenda n1 " s ronv i cf 11 m 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
T H I S C 0 U R T S H 0 U L D N Q T CONSIDER DEFENDANT S 
JURY INSTRUCTION CHALLENGE. 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT REQUESTED THE 
CHALLENGED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR. 
Defendant challenges two jury instructions given by the 
t i i d 1 I i. HI r I Si i IC e defei idai I t: :i : eques ted bo tl i :: f tl i€ ::;1 ia] lenged 
instructions , tl :i I s Court should summarily reject his argument 
based on *}~ doctrine of "invited error." 
1111jpi e n t t j I i Mir I S i i 11] mi in i i i i I h e i m l o x f , 
" [W]e reemphasize this Court's past decisions wherein we stated 
that 'invited error' is procedural]y unjustified and viewed with 
State v. Tillman ) . 
The Court recently explained, 'To rule otherwise would permit a 
defendant criminal case to 'invite' prejudicial error and 
implant record as a form, of appellate insurance against 
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an adverse sentence." State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 
(Utah 1989). 
In the present case, defendant implanted the 
instructional error to which he now complains. Prior to trial, 
defendant submitted a packet of jury instructions to the trial 
court (R. 58-94). Among the instructions submitted by defendant 
was an instruction on reasonable doubt and another on self-
defense (R. 59, 94). (See Appendices "A" and MC M). The trial 
court gave both instructions to the jury (R. 114, 129). (See 
Appendices "B" and "D"). Defendant now complains that the trial 
court used both of his instructions. 
As the Wyoming Supreme Court noted, a strong policy 
reason exists for not allowing a defendant to complain about jury 
instructions he drafted. "If we would condone the action of a 
party whereby he offers and obtains an erroneous instruction, 
thus trapping the trial court and insuring reversible error 
should the verdict be against him, each party to every lawsuit 
could attempt to hedge against an adverse verdict by doing 
likewise." Settle v. State, 619 P.2d 387, 388 (Wyo. 1980). See 
also Brooks v. State, 706 P.2d 664, 668 (Wyo. 1985) (continued 
vitality of Settle holding). 
Other States have also held that they will not allow a 
criminal defendant to complain on appeal about jury instructions 
the defendant submitted to the court. The appellate courts cite 
the policy considerations against "invited error". State v. 
Araqon, 107 Idaho 358, 690 P.2d 293, 298 (1984); State v. 
Tassler, 159 Ariz. 183, 765 P.2d 1007, 1009 (Ct. App. 1989); 
People v. Szloboda, 44 Colo. App. 164, 620 P.2d 36, 37 (1980). 
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While Utah has not addressed this issue in the context 
of a criminal case, the Utah Supreme Court has held - v; 
r rt B H I ! i el I I I  i H mi j s i •> 11II in < I P 111 n : a 1 1 a 11 q u H (j e i m i 11 \ i J 
instruction and the i nstruction given at trial "would rat-
within the rule of invited error of which the defendan* * oot 
II Straka v Voyles ; , 
679 (192* See also Brigham v. Moon Lake Elec. Ass'n, ah 
2d 292, t ^ r,^ --» ^ u '• wK~- -:*:•* ff requested jury 
instruction, no -- : : . , Mann v. Fairbourn, 
12 ll t a~ . 1961 j (complaint about 
substantias ±y uiy bame xnbtxuctxoa fails because of invited 
error). 
Additionally, defendant materially misrepresents the 
r » • - . - . • = ''I..' - - . r~t . COUrt 
delete; it^- 1...;. three paragraphs Appellant's proposed 
instructions and modified the first two paragraphs." (Brief of 
A|j],j' * • • ci notl :i I ng of the s : :i : t 
Defendant ctuall} submitted two proposed Instructions on 
reasonable doubt and two proposed instructions on self defense. 
( I i 'I I fin >i | HI | | I | | i i ,i | i i u i i < i i , s e i l i t - i n ! p a i i i m J 11 u I 
that a defendant is not entitled to multiple instructions on the 
same issue. State v. Moore, 782 P 2d 49' 7, 500 (Utah 1989); State 
v . Mi lie, 6 (I I I i tl ' :i ' See also State v. 
Reedy, 681 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1984) error when trial court 
Defendant repeatedly refers to the trial court as the author 
of the reasonable doubt instruction thus creating the erroneous 
impression that the trial court, not defendant, was the author 
(Brief of ^~~ ***- i i no i n i A ID I O \ 
-11 -
gave instruction similar in substance to instruction proposed by 
defendant). Cf. State v. Mills, 94 N.M. 17, 606 P.2d 1111, 1113 
(Ct. App. 1980) cert, denied 94 N.M. 628, 614 P.2d 545 (1980) 
(defendant cannot complain if he submits multiple instructions on 
an issue and the court gives one of the proposed instructions but 
not the others). 
Defendant exacerbates his misrepresentation by 
attaching as addendums to his brief the reasonable doubt and 
self-defense instructions given by the trial court as well as his 
alternative instructions which were not given. By doing so, 
defendant portrays the false impression that the trial court 
rejected or rewrote his proposed reasonable doubt and self-
defense instructions. Defendant fails to mention that he also 
authored the reasonable doubt and self-defense instructions 
actually given by the court. 
For example, attached as Appendix "A" to this brief is 
a reasonable doubt instruction requested by defendant (R. 59)(See 
Appendix "A"). Comparatively attached as Appendix MBM is the 
reasonable doubt instruction given by the court, which is 
identical to Appendix "A" (R. 114)(See Appendix MB"). Likewise, 
Appendices "C" and "D" represent a self-defense instruction 
proposed by defendant and an identical instruction given by the 
court (See Appendices "CM and MD M). Because defendant requested 
the instructions of which he now complains, this Court should not 
consider defendant's claim. 
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DEFENDANT FAILED TO TIMELY AND 
SPECIFICALLY OBJECT TO THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
In any event, this Court should refuse to address the 
merits of defendant challenge to the jury instructions because 
he f ailed 11 J 11ine Kpei * 11 i ca 11 y o b ) e c I 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states: 
No party may assign as error any portion of 
the charge or omission therefrom unless he 
objects thereto before the jury is 
instructed, stating distinctly the matter t<> 
which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection. Notwithstanding a parties fall ure 
to object, error may be assigned to 
instructions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice, 
Utah R. Grim, F, 19(c). 
Thn Ufa!'! Supreme '"'our!, has held that, " R U i e 19(c) 
requires more than a general exception to the instructions, It 
requires that the matter excepted * > /round therefor be 
s; --• - •. .- --* M State x , Cai.^. . • j
 r 5 94 (I It a h 
198£ . i another case, the Utah Supreme Court held that when no 
ground^ to: the objection were stated or apparent from the text 
ul I In instruct inn, ndivnn m v u r r e d S t a t e v Dumas, ' 72] IP", 2d 
502, 506 (Utah 1986), 
present case, the trial court heJd a bench 
ronf eren I don i ill jerl i uns i mi I lin rei < n d . 
The entire bench conference consists ul th«:j following exchange 
between the court, the prosecutor, and defense counsel. 
T h e C o u r t : W o u l d t h e c l e r k p l e a s e l a k e t h e reiina in J fig 
exhibits into the bailiff. 
Anything else? 
- 1 3 
Gentlemen, one other thing-while we have the record. 
We have met in chambers, we have discussed jury 
instructions and exceptions have been made to jury 
instructions prior to this time, I believe that you 
would now like to make those a part of the record; is 
that correct? 
Mr. Valdez [defense counsel]: Yes, your honor. 
Mr. MacDougall [prosecutor]: The State would have no 
excerptions, your honor. 
Mr. Valdez: It's my understanding we had made two 
excerptions to jury instructions. And I can only see 
one here. But the first exception would be to the 
instruction the court gave on reasonable doubt, and 
I'll mark that as Exception #1 and provide that to the 
court. Basically it's a longer version of the 
instruction the court gave and has more of a 
clarification we believe and also contains some cites 
of authority that we think supports our position. 
The Court: I believe it is in the packet with the 
file. 
Mr. Valdez: I believe it is. There should be one more 
exception, but I can't recall at this point what it 
was. Well, I guess that's it. I can't recall the 
other exception. Was there one or two, do you recall, 
Judge? 
The Court: I recall you making them in chambers, but 
we modified some of the exceptions. 
Mr. Valdez: I think that's the only exception, so with 
that we'll submit it. 
The Court: Very well, court will be in recess. 
(T. 280-81). 
As quoted above, defendant's objection to the jury 
instruction on reasonable doubt was not "distinctly stated," nor 
is any error apparent from the text of the instruction (See 
Appendix "A"). Defense counsel did not give a reason for his 
No transcript exists of this in-chambers conference, which is 
evidently why the court allowed objections on the record at this 
time. 
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objection other than his explanation that his other proposed 
instruction was longer and provided more "clarification" than the 
instruction given. Indeed, the other proposed instruction 
offered by defendant contains language similar to that rejected 
by a majority of the Utah Supreme Court. State v. Johnson, 774 
P.2d 1141, 1148 (1989) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result, 
joined by Durham and Zimmerman, JJ.). See also State v. Ireland, 
773 P.2d 1375, 1381 (Utah 1989)(Stewart, J., dissenting).4 
Regarding defendant's challenge to the self-defense 
instruction, it is well established that absent a timely and 
specific objection to a jury instruction in the trial court, a 
defendant cannot raise a claim of instructional error on appeal 
unless the error constitutes a "manifest injustice." Rule 19(c), 
Utah R. Crim. P. See State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 
1983). State v. Cloud, 722 P.2d 750, 755 n.4 (Utah 1986); State 
v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 504 (Utah 1987); State v. Parkin, 742 
P.2d 715, 716 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
In the instant case, defense counsel did not object to 
the self-defense instruction, leaving instead the clear 
impression that he only objected to the instruction on reasonable 
doubt when he stated, "I think that's the only exception, so with 
that we'll submit it." (R. 180, p. 281). Recognizing his failure 
Justice Stewart has criticized using the language "weighty 
affairs of life" in defining reasonable doubt. Johnson, 774 P.2d 
at 1148 (Stewart, J., concurring); Ireland, 773 P. 2d at 1381 
(Stewart, J., dissenting). Defendant's other proposed 
instruction used the language "weighty affairs of life" in 
defining what the reasonable doubt standard was not. The State 
considers this negative method of defining a distinction without 
a difference. 
-15-
to preserve his objection, defendant raises a claim of manifest 
injustice in a footnote (See Brief of App. at 25 n.12). 
Defendant's claim of manifest injustice is in the same 
posture as a claim earlier rejected by the Utah Supreme Court. 
State v. Medina, 738 P. 2d 1021 (Utah 1987). In Medina, defense 
counsel affirmatively stated she had no objection to the given 
jury instructions. Ld. at 1023 • The Medina Court refused to 
find manifest injustice when defense counsel consciously agreed 
to the instruction. Id. Likewise, in the present case, manifest 
injustice cannot arise where defendant drafted and requested the 
same jury instructions to which he now complains. See State v. 
Neher, 112 Wash. 2d 347, 771 P.2d 330, 332 (1989). 
POINT II 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT 
DEFENDANT OF MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
Defendant claims that the evidence was insufficient to 
convict him of murder in the second degree and that he should 
have been convicted of the lesser offense of manslaughter. 
Defendant's contention is without merit. 
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, the 
appellate standard of review is well-settled. See State v. 
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985). The Booker Court noted: 
[W]e review the evidence and all 
inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the 
jury. We reverse a jury verdict 
only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is sufficiently inconclusive or 
inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that 
the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted. 
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State v. Petreef Utah, 659 P. 2d 443, 444 
(1983); accord State v. McCardle, Utah, 652 
P.2d 942, 945 (1982). In reviewing the 
conviction, we do not substitute our judgment 
for that of the jury. It is the exclusive 
function of the jury to weigh the evidence 
and to determine the credibility of the 
witnesses . . . State v. Lamm, Utah, 606 P.2d 
229, 231 (1980); accord State v. Linden, 
Utah, 657 P.2d 1364, 1366 (1983). So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable 
inferences, from which findings of all the 
requisite elements of the crime can be 
reasonably made, our inquiry stops. 
Booker, 709 P.2d at 345. 
In the instant case, defendant was convicted of murder 
in the second degree, which provides as follows: 
76-5-203. Murder in the second degree. 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the second degree if the actor: 
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the 
death of another; [or] 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily harm to 
another, he commits an act clearly dangerous 
to human life that causes the death of 
another. 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989). 
Defendant was tried on the alternative theories of 
subsections (a) and (b). In order to convict defendant the jury 
had to find either that; (1) defendant intentionally or knowingly 
caused the death of Jerry Hermansen, or (2) while intending to 
cause serious bodily injury to Hermansen, defendant committed an 
act clearly dangerous to human life causing Hermansen's death (R. 
115). 
There is no dispute that defendant killed Hermansen. 
In fact, defendant admitted killing Hermansen before trial, at 
trial, and continues to admit doing so on appeal (T. 93, 199-200) 
-17-
(See Brief of App. at 27). The only question remaining is 
whether defendant caused the death intentionally/ knowingly, or 
while intending to cause serious bodily injury to Hermansen. 
Based on the evidence presented at trial, the jury 
could have reasonably inferred defendant's guilt. The evidence 
showed that defendant had possession of Hermansen's weapon (T. 
91, 119, 196, 197-98). At some point, while Hermansen's back was 
turned on defendant, defendant shot Hermansen twice. (T. 134-35, 
140-42). Additionally, defendant fatally shot Hermansen in the 
right side of the neck. (T. 137). All three shots were fired 
from more than fourteen inches away, which the pathologist could 
determine because there was no stippling or tattooing on 
Hermansen's body or his clothes (T. 140). While only the side 
shot to the neck was fatal, the other two shots were from behind 
Hermansen. A reasonable jury could determine that by firing at 
Hermansen, defendant intended to kill, or at least to cause 
serious bodily injury. 
Defendant asserts that he "feared for his life" 
justifying a finding of guilt for th€* lesser included offense of 
5 
manslaughter (Brief of App. at 26). However, as the Utah 
Supreme Court noted in another second degree murder case, 
"Assuming that the evidence would support a conviction for 
To support his claim, defendant cites State v. Knoll, 712 P.2d 
211 (Utah 1985) and State in re Gonzales, 545 P.2d 187 (Utah 
1975). However, these cases are easily distinguished. In Knoll 
the defendant was charged with second degree murder and convicted 
of manslaughter. Knoll, 712 P.2d at 212. In Gonzales, the 
defendant was charged with manslaughter. Gonzales, 545 P.2d at 
188. In this case, defendant was charged and convicted of second 
degree murder. 
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manslaughter, the jury, who are the sole judges of the facts, did 
not view the conflicting evidence that way." State v. Russell, 
733 P.2d 162# 169 (Utah 1987). 
Defendant's own conduct could reasonably cause a juror 
to disbelieve his version of the events. Defendant wrapped the 
murder weapon in a towel and sold it to his cocaine dealer, then 
told police that he had thrown the gun in the Jordan River (R. 
180, p. 55, 93). He told Detective Bell that Hermansen had 
attacked him with the knife, although another police officer had 
discovered the knife folded in Hermansen's pocket (R. 180, p. 33, 
91-92). At trial, defendant admitted lying to the police, giving 
the jury grounds to legitimately question defendant's veracity on 
the witness stand (R. 180, p. 201-03). 
As the Utah Supreme Court has previously stated, "The 
jury were [sic] not obligated to accept as true defendant's own 
version of the evidence nor his self-exculpating statements as to 
his intentions and his conduct. They were entitled to use their 
own judgment as to what evidence they would believe and to draw 
any reasonable inferences therefrom." State v. Schoenfeld, 545 
P.2d 193, 195 (Utah 1975). See also State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229, 
231 (Utah 1980); Efco Distrib., Inc. v. Perrin, 17 Utah 2d 375, 
379, 412 P.2d 615, 618 (1966); Webb v. 01 in Mathieson Chem. 
Corp., 9 Utah 2d 275, 342 P.2d 1094, 1101 (1959). The basic 
function of the jury is to weigh the conflicting evidence and 
draw conclusions from it. State v. Pierce, 722 P.2d 780, 782 
(Utah 1986). Despite defendant's testimony to the contrary, the 
jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that defendant 
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committed the offense of second degree murder. State v. Petree, 
659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ( r—day of August, 1990. 
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Attorney General 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is 
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he 
is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an 
absolute certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that 
is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those 
who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates all 
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable 
men and women would entertain, and it must arise from the evidence 
or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
APPENDIX B 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until 
he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily 
shown, he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the 
State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an 
absolute certainty. Now, by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt 
that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of 
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt 
which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly 
speculative possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is 
that degree of proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the 
understanding of those who are bound to act conscientiously upon 
it and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a 
doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain and it must 




You are instructed that laws of Utah do not require a 
defendant to establish self-defense by a preponderance or 
greater weight of the evidence, but merely to bring forward 
some evidence which tends to show self-defense. If the 
defendant has done this in any fashion, and if such evidence is 
believed by you to raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
unlawfulness of the act of shooting at Mr. Jerry Hermansen, you 
should find the defendant not guilty. 
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APPENDIX D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are instructed that laws of Utah do not require a 
defendant to establish self-defense by a preponderance or 
greater weight of the evidence, but merely to bring forward 
some evidence which tends to show self-defense. If the 
defendant has done this in any fashion, and if such evidence is 
believed by you to raise a reasonable doubt as to the 
unlawfulness of the act of shooting at Mr. Jerry Hermansen, you 
should find the defendant not guilty. 
